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The EU and the Rise of China 
Daniel Gros
1 
he EU should have no ideological problem in recognising the emerging power of China since it 
is not a major power itself (beyond the area of economics), so the rise of China should not 
create any particular friction within the EU. 
Moreover, while both the EU and China dominate their respective ‘near abroads’, their two spheres of 
influence do not overlap, which further reduces the potential for conflict. 
It is misleading to speak of an ‘EU position’ towards China, however. A key determinant of the 
European position(s!) towards the emerging economic power of China remains the incomplete internal 
institutional framework of the EU, which in many fields makes it very difficult to formulate and 
actively implement a coherent policy towards China. This has led to a distribution of roles whereby 
actors with little influence on actual foreign policy decisions (the EP, NGOs, national parliaments) 
specialise in symbolic gestures, and the actual hard policy decisions taken at the national and EU 
levels are mainly determined by perceived self interest. 
The lack of an EU position is particularly evident in the representation of ‘Europe’ in international 
organisations, especially the IFIs, like the IMF and the World Bank. In principle it is clear that in these 
institutions a smaller representation of European countries and a much larger one for China is 
warranted. The EU institutions agree on this (in private), but member states are not yet ready to 
formally acknowledge their diminished global role, although in reality they recognise their limited 
influence. 
The two exceptions to the rule that the EU does not have a China policy are in the areas of trade and 
(soon) the environment. China is already the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases (mainly CO2) and 
given its extensive, energy-intensive growth its emissions are certain to continue growing. Its 
contribution to global warming cannot be ignored and this is one key area where the EU (together with 
the US) needs to engage China constructively in order to avoid an open conflict. A successful 
compromise will require careful diplomacy on all sides: the EU, China and the US, whose conversion 
to cap and trade remains a necessary condition for the EU’s scheme to work properly. However, the 
EU’s institutional set up seems to be well prepared for this particular issue.  
The EU’s peculiar institutional configuration also implies that European ‘China bashing’ comes 
mainly from member states where, depending on the national context, leaders find it convenient to 
blame China for the economic difficulties of the moment. However, since conditions vary so much 
across member states ‘China bashing’ seldom comes from a large majority of member states at the 
same time and thus is very much less likely to lead to action against China than in the US, where 
populist policy stances can be more easily picked up by the federal institutions (Congress or the 
President). It is thus unlikely that the EU will assume an overall confrontational stance vis-à-vis 
China. 
Outside the area of economics there is even less reason to anticipate conflict between the EU and 
China for the simple reason that the EU as such does not have a great power position to defend (and its 
member countries have long given up the pretence of being great powers themselves). Hence it is 
difficult to imagine a coherent EU policy towards the rise of China. Member states will, over time, 
have to acknowledge that China is an increasingly important actor in many parts of the world, but they 
all pursue their own, national policies towards China, which are mainly determined by the national 
equilibrium between the interests of traders and human rights activists, with the interests of the former 
usually prevailing over the latter. Other national constituencies take scant interest in China. 
                                                      
1 Daniel Gros is the Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).   
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The remainder of this note concerns the economic issues that make up most of the substance of the 
EU-China relationship. 
Today the major sources of friction in the field of economic policy concern imports of labour-
intensive products and China’s large trade surplus. The first source of friction is likely to wane rapidly 
with the shift towards relatively capital-intensive production methods in China. However, the second 
source of friction is likely to persist as exports continue to be the main driver of demand and growth in 
China. But this seems to be more of an issue between the US and China, given that Europe is likely to 
continue to run a small current account surplus for the foreseeable future. 
A key peculiarity of China’s economy is its extraordinary degree of openness: exports amount to about 
40% of GDP, a figure closer to the average of individual EU member countries, rather than the 
approximate 15% one observes for large economies like Japan, or the EU and US. This implies that in 
many cases the outlook of China on global economic issues might be quite similar to that of most 
member countries. 
Moreover, about 60% of Chinese exports are generated by so-called ‘foreign invested enterprises’ 
(enterprises with a large foreign participation). Over one-half of the Chinese ‘export machine’ is thus 
managed by foreigners. This suggests that while China is likely to remain stubborn in the pursuit of its 
perceived national interests, it is unlikely to become a disruptive element in the world economy.  
Furthermore, China is already one of the biggest capital exporters (capital exports are the mirror-
image of its current account surpluses). This implies that China has a stake in the stability of the global 
financial system, but, as the events surrounding the rescue of US government-sponsored enterprises 
(Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac) showed, its stance remains rather passive since the accumulation of 
foreign assets occurred through foreign exchange market intervention at the central bank and central 
banks are always extremely conservative in their foreign investments, limiting themselves mostly to 
government (or quasi government) debt instruments. This is likely to change over time. As large 
Chinese corporations emerge they are increasingly likely to use their abundant and cheap funding to 
buy up assets around the world. It is thus conceivable that over the next decade many of the Western 
enterprises with strong investments in China will in turn have a large Chinese element in their capital 
base. All this is likely to strengthen the interest of China not only in an open and rules-based 
international trading system, but also an open global capital market. As a very large investor China 
must be interested in a rules-based framework for international finance because it might soon become 
the preferred target for restrictions on international capital flows. 
The EU and China should thus have a similar overall stance in global economic affairs: a general 
preference for an open and rules-based system. But both also dominate their respective regions. The 
overall multilateralism will probably be punctured by a number of regional agreements. 
The table below summarises the potential for a conflict of cooperation in the main areas of economic 
policy. 
Table 1. Areas of conflict and cooperation between EU-China 
  EU interests  Chinese interests  Likely outcome 
Trade      Common support for WTO 
Environment  Global reductions in 
emissions 
Avoid constraint on 
growth 
Conflict leading to 
compromise over trade 
measures 
Energy  Secure supplies without 
paying a moral price 
Secure supplies  Competition without 
animosity 
Finance I: regulation  More global co-operation  Indifferent  Little contact 
Finance II: SWF  Control over FDI  Avoid controls  Low level conflict 
Finance III: 
representation in IFIs 
  Recognition of 
economic size 
Internal conflict in EU: MS 
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1.  Economic fundamentals: China’s place in the global economy 
China and India are often mentioned in one breath as representing similar challenges for the EU (and 
indeed all OECD countries). However, the scale of the challenge from each of these two economies is 
not comparable. In terms of the sheer size of trade and investment flows the differences dwarf the 
similarities, as shown in Table 2 below. At current prices and exchange rates, the GDP of China is 
about twice that of India, and China exports nine times as many goods and still almost twice as many 
services. In terms of inward FDI, China is more than ten times larger than India. 
Table 2. China and the ‘West’: Comparing size ($ billion) 
GDP Trade  (exports)  Inward 
  Current exchange rates  PPP Goods  Services  FDI 
China 2,600  5,000  970  92  78 
EU  27 13,000  13,700 1330  192   
Sources: WEO database, Eurostat & International Comparison Programme (ICP) (2007) of the World Bank. 
The raw data suggest that China on its own is big enough to have a strong impact on the global 
economy (and on the EU). In the area of international trade China is now on a par with the EU and the 
US. The importance of China for the global economy is likely to increase as the combination of a 
housing bust and financial crisis weakens the transatlantic economy. If the Chinese economy were to 
maintain the gap in growth rates (i.e. if the slow-down in China is not stronger than that in the US or 
Europe) China’s economy would be roughly of a similar size in less than ten years. At that point the 
EU, the US and China would each account for about 20-25 % of global GDP. Moreover, if Chinese 
exports (and imports) were to continue to grow as they have done so over the last ten years, China 
alone would account for roughly one half of total world trade (and would export about 3 times as 
much as either the EU or the US). Past trends will not continue forever, but it is clear that even if they 
weaken the world trading system will increasingly revolve around China. 
2.  Capital accumulation as the key driver of growth in China 
Will China actually be able to continue to grow at this rapid pace and thus to catch up with the 
advanced economies over the next decade? The main reason for assuming that this will be the case is 
that the key motor behind this catching-up process is a fundamental upgrading of the human and 
physical capital stock in China.  
Both elements are equally important, but their upgrading is proceeding at somewhat different speeds: 
Physical capital 
Here the catching up process is quickest due to the extraordinarily high rate of savings in China.  
For an economist the key measure for the capital stock is the capital/labour ratio, which to a large 
extent also determines the level of productivity and thus of wages. The key factor that dominates the 
evolution of the capital/labour ratio in China is the very high Chinese investment rate. While there is 
some debate over the measurement of the denominator (GDP), it is generally agreed that China invests 
more than 40% of its GDP (against about 20% for the EU and the US, and 25 % for India). This must 
be the starting point for any assessment of this issue.  
FDI plays only a minor part in determining the overall resources devoted to investment since total FDI 
inflows represent only around 10% of all investment in China. The importance of FDI for China is 
thus not the amount of capital invested, but the transfer of technology that it brings about. 
The direct consequence of the extraordinarily high rate of capital accumulation in China is that it leads 
to an unprecedented increase in the capital/labour ratio (a key determinant of productivity). Gros 
(2008) calculates that within 15 years China will have a similar capital/labour ratio as the EU, which 
will have major implications for economic relations between the EU and China. Most European 4 | DANIEL GROS 
policy-makers still seem to be under the impression that imports from China are likely to threaten 
mainly labour-intensive industries, such as textiles and clothing. Given the extremely high investment 
rates in China, however, this is likely to change rather quickly. As the difference in capital/labour 
ratios is shrinking rapidly, the composition of Chinese exports should shift quickly as well; with 
Chinese exports becoming more capital (and energy) intensive. 
Human capital 
While the current policy concerns focus on cheap labour, there have been a number of press reports 
suggesting that China is rapidly catching up in terms of innovation activity. The raw data suggest, 
however, that concerns about China taking the lead in innovation activity on a broad scale are 
exaggerated. Moreover, in this area the speed at which China can close the gap with the EU is limited 
by demographic factors. With a roughly constant population, the average stock of human capital per 
worker can change only gradually as better-educated new generations replace the older ones. This is 
by definition a slow process. 
The starting point in terms of human capital in China is not far from the EU average, but it is still 
clearly behind (with an average 6 years of schooling versus 8-10 years for most EU member 
countries). The level China has today is widely regarded as sufficient to build up a strong industrial 
base, but not to become a leader in innovation. 
However, human capital accumulation is also accelerating at a very rapid pace in China as one can see 
from the enrolment ratios, especially in higher education. An indispensable input for R&D is a 
workforce with the appropriate level of education. Research and development is mostly undertaken by 
personnel with tertiary (university level) education. In China the enrolment rates in tertiary education 
are increasing at a very rapid pace, but the level reached in 2005 was still only 20%, much lower than 
the 56% recorded for the EU (and even further from the US ratio of 83%). Over the last 20 years there 
has been a jump in tertiary education in China, with enrolment ratios increasing by a factor of 7. But 
the starting point was so low that even today enrolment rates are below one-half of the European level.  
As an aside, it is interesting to note that despite its reputation for strength in high-tech services, India 
has made much less progress than China (tertiary enrolment up only from 6 to 11%). The Indian 
software industry seems to constitute an exception that hides an average that has fallen way behind 
that of China. 
The available data thus suggest that for some time the Chinese workforce will continue to lag behind 
that of the EU (and even more than that of the US) in terms of the percentage of younger cohorts that 
have a tertiary education. 
The upgrading of the skills of the Chinese workforce is thus proceeding less quickly than is sometimes 
assumed. However, one needs to recall that the cohorts that are currently studying (and will soon enter 
the labour force) are also much more numerous in China (about 3 times as many) than in the EU. This 
implies that in absolute terms one should expect that China already produces as many university 
graduates (including engineers, which have been the focus of much attention) as the EU. Moreover, as 
enrolment rates are still increasing rapidly it is unavoidable that China will eventually overtake the EU 
(and the US) in terms of the number of scientists that graduate each year.  
Table 3. Enrolment ratios, 1985-2005 
  Secondary education (Net)  Tertiary education (Gross) 
  1985 1995 2005 1985  1995  2005 
China 39.7  65.8  74.3  2.9  5.3  20.3 
United States  91.2  90  89  60.2  80.9  82.7 
India 37.9  48.8  56.6  6  6.6  11.4 
EU27 (average)  82.7  97.9  100.8  26.7  44.9  56.2 
Source: World Bank. THE EU AND THE RISE OF CHINA | 5 
3.  Finance: China’s absence 
Although China is a giant in the field of trade it is still a dwarf in the area of finance. While China and 
the US are about the same size in terms of exports there is a huge difference in terms of financial 
openness: in absolute dollar terms the external assets and liabilities of the US are about ten times 
greater than those of China. And even measured against exports one can see from the chart below that 
China is much more interested in trade issues than in financial markets. 
Figure 1. Financial globalisation 
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That China is also much less integrated in the global capital markets can also be seen from the 
importance of capital flows (as opposed to the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities), which for China 
amount to little more than 10% of GDP, compared to about 30% of GDP for the US. China’s interest 
in constructing a new order for global financial markets is thus rather limited. 
Figure 2. Total capital flows (inflow+outflow) as a % of GDP 
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4.  Energy: China’s carbon-rich economy 
Another area in which China will be a dominant player on the global scene is greenhouse gas 
emissions. As shown in Table 4, China already consumes almost as much energy as the EU (1,700 
million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe)/year versus 1,780), implying that its energy intensity (energy 
consumption per unit of output) is similar to that of the EU, at least if GDP is measured at PPP. 
However, the composition of China’s energy consumption is quite different from that of the EU (or 
the US): China consumes almost four times as much coal as the EU. Moreover, if current trends 
continue, in 10 years China will consume 50% more energy than the EU. Most of the increase in 
energy demand is likely to continue to come from coal, which is relatively abundant in China.  
Table 4. Energy consumption and composition (mtoe*) 
Primary energy consumption  Major fuels (2006) 
  1996  Today (2006)   Projected (2016)  Oil (net imports)  Coal (consumption) 
EU 1691  1782  1878  720  (560)  320 
US 2190  2326  2471  940  (608)  567 
China 965  1698  2987  350  (169)  1,191 
India 271  423  680  120  (80)  240 
* Modification Table of Organization and Equipment. 
Sources: BP (2007), World Energy Review. 
China’s self-sufficiency in coal has two implications: 
i)  China is already the biggest source of CO2 emissions (coal is much more intensive in CO2 than the 
equivalent energy obtained through oil or gas).  
ii)  China is much less dependent on hydrocarbon imports than either the EU or the US, and the price 
of coal has increased much less than that for either oil or gas. India resembles China in that it also 
has abundant coal reserves, but in terms of overall size, they are again much smaller, about one-
quarter of those of China, with a total annual consumption of primary energy of about 400 mtoe. 
Climate change is thus an area where considerable friction seems unavoidable. China will not be 
willing to accept any absolute limit on its emissions of CO2. However, China also knows that if both 
the EU and the US introduce a ‘cap and trade’ system (which puts a visible price on carbon) its 
exports might be subject to ‘border measures’, i.e. an import tax on carbon content. Given China’s 
huge stake in keeping its exports growing there might be room for a compromise in the sense that in 
exchange for keeping access to its two major markets China agrees to a specific set of other measures 
to limit domestic emissions of CO2. 
China will not be able to avoid a major policy clash (not only with the EU) on how to prevent global 
warming given that Chinese exports contain a substantial amount of all the CO2 emitted in China 
(according to most estimates around one third). This implies that the EU cannot ignore the ‘carbon 
leakage’ that results if the EU puts a price on carbon, but major exporters do not do the same. This 
leaves the EU with only the choice to tax the carbon content of its imports. Such a policy could most 
probably be made WTO-compatible; implying that membership in this organisation will afford little 
protection to China. Furthermore, own calculations indicate that the tariff rate that would result from 
taxing the CO2 content of imports would be around 8%, which would constitute a substantial hurdle 
for Chinese exports, which still contain large amounts of CO2. The Chinese leadership has already 
indicated that it might be amenable to compromise given that exports constitute the key driver of 
growth in China and given that the importance of environmental concerns is also becoming self-
evident in China itself, in the form of excessive levels of local pollution.  
By contrast, the signs from India are that it would take a confrontational stance, taking the issue to an 
arbitration panel in the WTO. THE EU AND THE RISE OF CHINA | 7 
5.  Summary of economic issues 
The likely Chinese and EU positions regarding major global economic policy issues can be 
summarised as follows: 
1)  Trade: China has been a major beneficiary of the rules-based global trading framework (WTO). It 
is likely to support this system, which it is anyway bound to dominate. 
2)  Climate change: this will be a key area of friction. The EU and China are on opposite sides here, 
but a compromise is still possible, indeed likely. 
3)  Energy: As China depends less on access to hydrocarbons than others and since it does not have 
political problems in the Middle East, its interest will be limited. 
4)  Global finance: China does not have a stake in financial market regulation and will resist any 
attempt to interfere with its exchange rate policy in the context of global surveillance. A greater 
role in the global financial institutions might be welcome for China, but would only be used to 
block interference with its own policy (much as the US has done so far). 
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Washington Tea Parties: 
Managing Problems and Imagining Solutions 
in US China Policy 
Brantly Womack
1 
here are two American tea party traditions, both relevant to American attitudes towards the rise 
of China. The first is English-style polite; playing by the rules. Applied to China policy, its 
influence can be seen in constructive engagement, encouraging China to be a responsible 
stakeholder. The second is Boston-style dramatic unilateralism.
2 The urge to stand tall, to upset the 
table, is most evident in declarations about US China policy aimed at domestic American audiences. 
These two contrary trends are evident in their purest form at both ends of the spectrum of attitudes 
towards China, but the tension between them defines the general ambivalence in America’s 
perspective on the rise of China. Since the end of the Cold War the US has generally played by the 
rules in managing specific problems in its relations with China, but at the same time there has been a 
vocal undercurrent wanting to solve the ‘China problem’ in various ways. Both of these trends are 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Regardless of the call for change reverberating in the 
current presidential campaign – and the real changes occurring in the global economy – Washington is 
likely to continue to be influenced by both tea parties for the time being, but with a preference for 
practical management at the presidential level. 
Although the presidential candidates had quite different styles and emphases in their pronouncements 
regarding China, the tea party tensions were evident in both. Their most extensive and personal 
statements on China policy can be found in China Brief, a publication of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Beijing (AmCham-China).
3 Since the table is set in China among American 
businessmen, the venue favours the polite tea party approach. McCain is certainly the more Bostonian 
of the two. He couches his positive gestures in more general frameworks of relations with Asia and 
commitments to free trade, while most of his China-specific comments focus on what China needs to 
do in order to be an acceptable stakeholder: “The next administration should be clear about where 
China needs to make progress.” McCain would like to see more transparency in China’s military 
build-up and more cooperation against ‘pariah states.’ On the other hand, McCain claims that “China 
and the United States are not destined to be adversaries,” and his opposition to protectionism would 
restrain the use of economic sanctions. 
Obama’s essay is more carefully crafted and more comprehensive. It touches on the major points of 
policy contact between the US and China, and seems designed to be well received not only by 
American businessmen in China, but by the Chinese themselves. He praises China’s economic 
accomplishments and balances an admonition about sustainable growth with the admission that the 
United States also must make “serious adjustments.” He is optimistic about the direction of relations 
across the Taiwan Strait and about cooperation on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. He 
emphasises, unlike McCain, that Asian security requires the inclusion of China in strategic 
cooperation. However, Obama also indicates that he is prepared to stand up to unfair trading practices.  
                                                      
1 Brantly Womack is Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. 
2 On 16 December 1773, citizens of Boston as the “Sons of Liberty” boarded three East India Company ships 
and threw 45 tons of Darjeeling tea into Boston harbour as part of a dispute over taxes and control of trade. The 
event, known as the “Boston Tea Party,” was an important precursor to the American Revolution a few years 
later. 
3 John McCain, “US-China Policy Under a McCain Administration”, China Brief,  September 2008 
(http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/amcham/show/whatisnew.php?Id=88); Barack Obama, “US-China Relations 
Under an Obama Administration”, China Brief, September 2008 (http://www.amcham-china.org.cn/amcham/ 
show/whatisnew.php?Id=89). 
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The context of talking to American businessmen already engaged in China is quite different from a 
town meeting in a union hall in Ohio. Moreover, these pieces are more likely to have been written by 
the candidates’ China specialists than by their Ohio specialists. Both candidates are therefore showing 
the sunny sides of their China policies. The shadows can be seen in their silences. McCain does not 
mention Taiwan. Anything he would say would risk alienating either his present audience or his more 
right-wing and defence industry supporters back home. Moreover, his emphasis on America’s allies in 
Asia and his complaint about Chinese military opacity could fit into a Rumsfeld-Cheney view of 
China as the looming strategic threat. For Obama’s part, his brief and mild mention of human rights as 
an issue in US-China relations is certainly a far cry from Bill Clinton’s declamations against the 
“butchers of Beijing.” It is either an indication of a difference with anti-China crusaders such as 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi or its brevity is merely a prudent silence in front of a business 
audience. Moreover, he does not detail his advocacy of a value-based international trade system to an 
audience that includes critics of China’s new labour law. 
In general, it is impressive that neither presidential candidate used China as a scapegoat for the current 
economic crisis, preached a crusade against Chinese communism, or called America to arms against 
the China threat. I would agree with the overall assessment by Professor Shen Dingli of Fudan 
University that the lack of heat in China issues in the current campaign is a sign that “Sino-US 
relations are stabilizing.”
4 Of course, each of the China-hostile options remains open to a new 
president, regardless of campaign rhetoric. But China-bashing would be more useful as a tool of 
campaign rhetoric than as a basis for policy, so the restraint of both candidates is significant. 
Nevertheless, differences of national interests remain, as well as the domestic political appeal of future 
Boston tea parties. 
The underlying difficulty of American ambivalence towards China is that polite problem management 
involves at least a formal acceptance of the legitimacy of the other side as well as the possibility that 
one might have to settle for less than one’s maximum demands. Moreover, exceptionalism is not 
allowed. Everyone plays by the same rules and everyone must wait their turn.  
For China, newly allowed a seat at the global table, playing by the rules is a sign of status. But for the 
US, the sole superpower, letting China into the game appears as a necessary condescension, especially 
since China is an unfamiliar newcomer, and a communist one to boot. Even the official terminology of 
engagement – encouraging China to become ‘a responsible stakeholder’ and to be ‘socialised’ into the 
international system – implies a status difference rather than mutual respect. It is not the rules per se 
that chafe, since the US wrote them, but rather the necessity of the game. And with China’s rise to 
global presence in the new century the games appear both more necessary and more frustrating. 
To a great extent the two tea parties express the tension between the necessity of managing the 
relationship with China and the lingering impulse to ‘solve’ the China problem. Since the task of 
managing the relationship falls to the American president, even China problem-solvers like Ronald 
Reagan and Bill Clinton moved towards more accommodating diplomacy once they were elected. The 
presidential learning process has now filtered down to the level of presidential candidates, but there 
are still many public voices, including congressional ones, that want to dump the tea in the harbour 
(this time Chinese tea) and consider any compromise or even delay as a sign of official cowardice.
5 
The premise of the latter-day Bostonians is that if only bold moves were taken, the China problem 
could be solved, a premise known to be false by those in charge of managing the relationship. 
Nevertheless, the calls from the sidelines to stand tall against China exert pressure on presidential 
rhetoric and on policy options. 
                                                      
4 Shen Dingli, “Beijing’s Perspective: Sino-U.S. Relations and the 2008 Presidential Election”, China Brief 
(Jamestown Foundation), 8, p. 18, 23 September 2008 
(http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/cb_008_018.pdf). 
5 See for example “Testimony of Sophie Richardson [Human Rights Watch] before the Congressional-Executive 
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The global economic crisis currently unfolding will add to the tensions between managing the US-
China relationship and calling for solutions. Although the crisis will have negative effects on both 
countries, the US and China face the crisis from vastly different perspectives. For the US, the 
International Monetary Fund estimates a GDP growth rate of one-tenth of 1% for 2009, and it admits 
that this is the optimistic edge of its range.
6 Cassandra speaks more gently to China, predicting a fall 
from its 2007 growth rate of 11.9% to 9.3% in 2009.
7 Although the predicted gap in growth rates is 
actually smaller in 2009 than it was in 2007, the psychological effect of an American economy 
stagnant at best and a Chinese economy still galloping forward will be immense.  
It is almost inevitable that there will be a temptation to scapegoat China as the cause of the crisis, and 
to see solving the China problem as the solution to America’s economic problems. China will certainly 
be the most inviting target for protectionist sentiments, and any concrete step that China could take 
will elicit from many on the sidelines the response, “Not enough!” More subtly, it is imaginable that 
companies and institutions with interests in military budgets for high-tech weaponry will feel doubly 
threatened by an economic crisis and an Obama presidency, and will therefore exaggerate the ‘China 
threat’ in order to profit from being the solution.
8 
Nevertheless, the actual magnitude and complexity of the global economic crisis are almost certain to 
keep the management of the US-China relationship within the bounds of mutual interest. As Henry 
Paulson’s recent article in Foreign Affairs suggests, cooperation and mutual understanding between 
the US and China will be essential to coping with both the immediate problems caused by the collapse 
of institutions and expectations and the longer term problems of global economic restructuring.
9 
China’s foreign reserves, its growth rate, and its centrality to Asia combine to make it a reality that 
cannot be imagined away. China is too important as part of the possible way out of global economic 
uncertainty to be dismissed as a problem. 
There will of course be hard bargaining on economic issues. In 2009 no US president will be able to 
afford a trade and investment policy that ignores the problem of jobs at home and trade deficits. 
Pressures for greater protection of intellectual property and for raising the exchange rate of the 
renminbi (RMB) will continue regardless of China’s actual accomplishments in these areas. There will 
be pressure for greater quality control of exports. An Obama administration is likely to emphasise 
environmental and labour concerns in its trade policy. These matters are not simple contradictions 
between national interests, however. China has already overhauled its labour law and the milk crisis 
has created a firestorm of popular demand for product quality control. There would be major domestic 
beneficiaries both to greater IP protection and to raising the exchange rate. Since the issues are not 
zero-sum, it should be possible to negotiate compromises. 
In my opinion, the greatest danger of Bostonian disruption of the US-China relationship would come 
from diverging reactions to third country events rather than from an economic crisis. Although 
accidents in bilateral relations can never be ruled out – prime examples are the bombing of the 1999 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 spy plane incident – these typically lead to incident-
focused, temporary crises. By contrast, continued American unilateral adventurism could lead to 
standoffs in which China and the US could assume increasingly adversarial positions. By temperament 
and by policy record Obama would not be likely to continue the path of the last eight years. The same 
could not be said of a McCain-Palin administration given his penchant for ‘zingers’, out-of-the-box 
quick fixes and her moral primitivism. Intervention in Iran or North Korea would confirm a pattern of 
behaviour that China would find offensive and implicitly threatening. However, in the context of 
                                                      
6 International Monetary Fund, Global Economic Outlook: October 2008, Washington, 2008, p. 51. 
7 Ibid, p. 65. 
8 See Jim Lobe, “Hawks looking for New and Bigger Enemies?”, Interpress Service News Agency, 5 May 2008 
(http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33143). 
9 Henry Paulson, “A Strategic Economic Engagement: Strengthening U.S.-Chinese Ties”, Foreign Affairs, 
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pressing economic problems and existing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, further adventures 
are less likely. A third-country event that is not caused by either the US or China, such as the collapse 
of the Myanmar government, would expose differences of national perspective but would more likely 
lead to issues of diplomatic management than confrontation. 
The global economic crisis will slow China’s rise in absolute terms, but it is likely to increase its 
growth rate relative to developed economies. China is likely to be the most stable major economy in a 
world of global economic uncertainty. Moreover, its cautious financial policies and multilateral 
diplomacy are well-suited to the new environment of uncertainty. China will be a major player in the 
restructuring of the global economy, and it will become the decisive player in the Asian regional 
economy. China’s international prestige is likely to leap forward. 
The United States inevitably has ambiguous feelings about the rise of China. On the one hand, it is a 
new reality beyond American control and economically it has been a win-win process. We may not be 
in a Chinese century, but we are certainly in a century with China. On the other hand, it erodes the 
American sense of self-importance and self-confidence in being the world’s only superpower. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that even as the core momentum of a stable US-China relationship builds, 
American attitudes will also show a tendency to imagine a solution to the ‘China problem’ and a 
return to happier days of unilateralism.  
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Variants of Russia’s Policy 
towards the Rise of China 
Alexei D. Voskressenski
1 
ussia and China maintain complex external relations with the rest of the world, notably in their 
strategies towards Asia, and both aim to exploit the potential of the other to accelerate their 
national modernisation projects. It is against this background that the political elites of Russia 
and China strive to construct a strategic partnership.
2 A number of actors explain China’s well-known 
interest in Russia: Russia’s military-technical potential, its power projection capabilities, its 
independent foreign policy and Russia’s resources and raw materials are among the factors at play. 
These resources supply some of China’s production chains, especially in the northern provinces of the 
country.
3 In an international and geopolitical sense Russia has become a key ally to China, helping to 
resolve global issues and regional questions on the northern and north-western borders of the country, 
from communication in the UN Security Council to a certain coordination of diplomatic activities in 
the Near East and Central Asia (including strengthening the joint project: the Shanghai Organization 
of Cooperation) etc. Russia’s economic interest in China is linked to the realisation of China’s 
military-technical and security programmes, which are undergoing forced modernisation but have 
limits in terms of attracting national and international technologies for military modernisation. There 
are also opportunities to receive Chinese investments and relatively sophisticated but cheap 
technology to benefit Russia’s regional economy. Some analysts also argue that Chinese labour 
resources could be of some interest to Russia. 
Notwithstanding the intense growth of official parameters in bilateral economic activity and the 
internationalisation of the economy in the Russian Far East, which is becoming the main focus for 
Russia’s political elite in Russian-Chinese relations, the intense Russian-Chinese trade turnover barely 
disguises serious problems, both on a regional and federal level of relations. Russian interests demand 
that its economic relations with foreign, especially neighbouring countries have a stabilising influence 
on the Russian economy as a whole. They also aim to promote its structural transformation, eliminate 
economic disparities between the Russian regions, strengthen the expansion of Russian state 
corporations and private businesses in international markets, increase the economic role of the country 
internationally and, finally, ‘tighten’ the territories of the Russian nation-state into a single whole. This 
reinforcement of the concept of Russian statehood should assume a special role for the regions in 
national development. This does not occur in reality, however.
4 
Since the end of the 1980s the Chinese authorities have carried out a sophisticated strategy of forced 
modernisation and rapid development based on importing foreign technologies and equipment and, 
recently, with an emphasis on strengthening export-oriented production structures in the territories of 
north-east and north-west China, mechanical engineering and electronic equipment. The realisation of 
such a strategy has coincided with the economic opening of the Russian Far East, Transbaikalia and 
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R VARIANTS OF RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE RISE OF CHINA | 13 
Siberia. It also coincides with the economic crisis in Russia and, accordingly, with the massive imports 
into Russian regions of foreign goods to offset the consequences of the Russian economic crisis of the 
1990s. Chinese strategy was later reformulated to meet domestic demand – unfettered by world market 
limitations. These phenomena have led to high rates of economic growth for China as a whole and in 
recent decades also for north-eastern China neighbouring Russia. This recent economic growth far 
surpasses that of Russia as a whole, especially that of the Russian Far East and Transbaikalia 
territories. China’s success will probably continue well into the 21
st century. 
A number of factors explain the relative vulnerability of Russia’s Far Eastern inter-regional economic 
development compared to other countries and especially to China: the sparseness of the population in 
the Russian periphery, the uncertainty of the regional development model, infrastructural 
backwardness and the length of communication lines between Russian-Chinese trade and economic 
cooperation. These factors have promoted the resolution of trade and economic problems in north-
eastern China, but not in the Russian Far East, though they have led to the increased circulation of 
imported technologies and products in the Russian Far East and Siberia.  
These negative trends in the Russian economic territories, especially in the regions bordering China, 
have not really been addressed, although a number of measures have been undertaken by the Russian 
authorities. An analysis of regional economic development shows that despite a dynamic increase in 
the parameters of Russian-Chinese trade, the Russian Far East is slowly but surely losing economic 
ties with the rest of the country and lowering its industrial production, with no visible substitution of 
new spheres of economic development since the late 1990s. The population there continues to decline, 
the region generally continues to reorient its exports (first of all in terms of resources and raw 
materials) towards China, and at the same time the Russian Far East is marginalising itself within the 
system of regional economic relations. Such a situation, in the opinion of Russian experts, could result 
in further regional imbalance in Russia, especially if accompanied by certain negative events, and 
would result in the loosening of state control over the far eastern territories. Other Russian experts, on 
the other hand, consider the prospects of Russian-Chinese political and economic interaction, 
especially on the world stage, as a counterweight to all the problems arising within the regional 
relations between Russia and China.  
For the most part Chinese analysts believe that in the next 10 years Russia will not be able to wean 
itself off the model of exporting raw materials and hydrocarbons, and accordingly Russian raw 
materials will remain the basic staple of Chinese imports for the foreseeable future. However, since 
Russia has generated impressive economic growth over the last decade, it will need industrial and 
technical equipment, relatively advanced but not too expensive pharmaceutical products and light 
industry goods, and consequently will import these goods from China, especially to the Far East and 
Siberia. From the point of view of Chinese analysts, it is necessary to establish joint Russian-Chinese 
enterprises in those technological spheres that are underdeveloped or non-existent in China, 
cooperating in those areas that are above all labour-intensive. This means that Chinese enterprises will 
pay extra attention to the construction industries, communication and engineering infrastructure 
markets in Russia, for which Chinese labour resources will be in high demand and will probably be 
warmly welcomed. Such an analytical vision of regional development only partially corresponds to the 
desire of the Russian political elite to provide industrial help to the Chinese programme of reviving the 
old industrial base in the north-east of China.
5 This programme of possible Russian participation in the 
industrial modernisation of Manchuria is considered by some factions within Russian political and 
analytical circles as an important if not core part of the acceleration of social and economic 
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development of the Russian Far East and Transbaikalia, since it gives these territories a chance to 
revitalise their industries.
6 
Thus today, the main sticking point in the economic relations between Russia and China and therefore 
the target of any Russian solution to the further rise of China is the structural imbalance in Russian-
Chinese trade and economic relations and the disparity between them and their regional components. 
The quality and structure of bilateral economic relations, especially its regional dimension, do not 
match the proclaimed strategic character of relations between the two countries. In order to overcome 
these negative trends in the Far East and Transbaikalia, the Russian government has elaborated a 
multitask and multidimensional Federal programme: “Economic and social development of the Far 
East and Transbaikalia in 1996-2005 and till 2010”. Realisation of this programme provides the 
alignment of an economic situation in the Russian Far East and Transbaikalia in comparison with 
other regions of Russia and allows the softening or even elimination of negative factors prevalent 
today. The question, however, is: what role will be played by Russian-Chinese regional relations in 
this situation because the direction, character and intensity of the final success of the Russian federal 
programme “Economic and social development of the Far East and Transbaikalia in 1996-2005 and till 
2010” depends on the answer to this. If the Russian authorities manage to formulate the political, legal 
and economic conditions, incentives and limitations necessary for a Russian-Chinese collaboration 
that would guarantee steady development, especially in the eastern regions of the country, there would 
be no need for a special solution to the issue of China rising. In my view this policy should not consist 
of the forced modernisation model, which only solves short-term problems under certain conditions 
and has many negative consequences for the economy and the population, but should be a formulation 
of the system of priorities; the cumulative effects of which can speed up modernisation, limit negative 
trends and would constitute a policy of state-business partnership. 
Russia has four detailed conceptual approaches to the development of Russian-Chinese relations, 
including Russian-Chinese regional interaction and also the possible solution to the rise of China. The 
concept of open regionalism has two subvariants: the first relies on investments from the Asian-Pacific 
region and the regional export of Russian raw materials;
7 the second relies mostly on Russian federal 
resources and a more diversified export model.
8 Despite the administrative resources already generated 
by these variants, it would seem that they cannot halt negative (for Russia) regional trends, probably 
because of insufficient coordination or the different views of the situation from the regions and the 
centre, where there may also be insufficient political support. The world financial crisis does not help 
in the implementation of these strategies either.  
The Russian-Chinese co-development strategy
9 has also been elaborated in detail and has considerable 
administrative resources allocated to it. The implementation of this strategy began in 2005, but has not 
yet led to the alignment of the rates of development, at least not in the Russian and Chinese bordering 
regions and did nothing to curb negative phenomena for Russia. Co-development as it was conceived 
would not necessarily mean equally beneficial development, though it could be based on partial, but 
unequally mutual benefits. 
Two other approaches are also analysed in detail here. The multifactor analysis of 
international/regional relations and security based on energy diplomacy is the pragmatic tool of 
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7 S. Darkin, Russian Pacifica: Strategy, economy, security,  Мoscow: Delo Publishers, 2007; P. Minakir, 
Economic development and international cooperation in the North-Eastern Asia, Vladivostok: Dalnauka 
Publishers, 2001. 
8 V. Ishaev, “Strategy of the development of the Far East in the changing world” 
(http://adm.khv.ru/invest2.nsf/AllNewsRus/ab5e4b18fa714c5cca256d1f0026d9d8). 
9 B. Kuzik and М. Titarenko, Russia and China 2050: Strategy of codevelopment, Russian Academy of Sciences, 
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promoting Russian national interests in Greater Eastern Asia.
10 Such an assessment of a regional 
azimuth is integrated within the concept of multi-factor equilibrium approach and, as a matter of fact, 
represents a vision of macro-regional processes within a relatively coherent macro-approach. Applied 
questions of economic and especially regional economic interaction have not yet been developed on 
the basis of the concept of multi-factor equilibrium.
11 This approach steers the development of 
Russian-Chinese relations in conformity with the model of more balanced multilateral regional 
development. One of the most obvious implementation measures within the parameters of this 
approach is the construction of the Western Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, which is aiming to bring 
cooperation to the competitive regional energy market and open it to all interested regional 
participants.  
The so-called ‘guardian’ or ‘Russia as a fortress’ concept sees the army and the state safeguarding the 
development of Russian-Chinese regional relations. This concept is also elaborated in detail,
12 but has 
no definite administrative support although, apparently, there are some supporters in the state and 
military structures, especially in the border areas. This approach has been partially implemented in the 
Far Eastern frontier zone, its strength consisting of the appeal to the historical experience of Russian-
Chinese economic interaction where the structuring role from the Russian side was traditionally 
played by the state and army. This approach also has obvious weak points however, of which the first 
is the under-assessment of new global trends (regionalism, particularly)
13 and a reliance, first of all, on 
primarily non-economic actors and accordingly her a priori money and resources consuming 
character
14 which will inevitably lead to the curtailing of regional economic interaction in the region 
and the reliance on only federal financial and military power resources. It is quite probable that as a 
result of the implementation of this concept some kind of semi-power/supramilitary opposition in an 
economic zone of the Russian-Chinese border-region will arise. This approach would definitely be 
economically detrimental in these times of economic crisis and stagnation. 
What is clear is that in the future, due to the current political power restructuring in Moscow, we can 
envisage the synthesis of these four approaches as the effective state strategy for the development of 
the Russian Far Eastern territories within the limits of Russian-Chinese partnership, and the 
multilateral cooperation in north-east Asia. It is not yet clear however whether the assessment of the 
four above-mentioned approaches to ensure the steady, balanced, highly competitive, open and 
mutually advantageous regional development in which Russia will take a worthy place has been 
elaborated or not.  
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